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1
This paper analyzes wage competition between national trade unions caused
by international capital mobility. Capital mobility gives investors the possi-
bility to transfer their capital to the country offering the most favdrable
investment conditions. With their influence on the wage level, national trade
unions determine an important aspect of these investment conditions. Other
things equal, a country with comparatively low wage costs will therefore
attract more mobile capital than other countries. As labor demand and
therefore employment increases with the invested capital stock, trade unions
concerned about the aggregate employmenl level will take this relationship
into account in their wage demands.
A widely disseminated model of trade union behavior is that of a monopoly
union fixing the wage level and firms subsequently adjusting employment.
2
This paper replaces the monopoly union model of a closed country by that of
an oligopoly of national trade unions - tied together through the international
mobility of capital.
3 It analyzes wage competition in a simple symmetric one-
good-two-factor model of the open economy.
4 Both the structure and results
1 This paper is a revised version of Kiel Working Paper 5G9. 1 thank Hcnning Klodt and
Karl-Heinz Paque for helpful eomments on the previous version. The paper is part of a
researeh project entitled "Standortwcltbcwerb bei internationalcr Kapitalmobilitat".
Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is gratefully acknowledged.
2 For a description of the monopoly model of the trade union, see e.g. Oswald (1985) or
Holmlund (1989).
"' The implications of trade in consumption goods for the behavior of labor unions are
treated for example in Davidson (1988), Dowrick (1989) or Kemp ct al. (1991).
4 Oswald (1979) also investigates wage competition caused by the possibility of firms to
substitute labor offered by different trade unions. In contrast to this paper, he derives a
continuous labor demand function from a partial equilibrium model assuming an aggre--2-
of wage competition in this framework resemble that of the Bertrand model
of price competition with capacity constraints: First, an equilibrium in pure
strategies implies full employment in all countries. Second, such an equilib-
rium may not exist for certain parameter values. ;
The properties of the factor market equilibrium with international capital
mobility are derived in section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the equilibrium of
wage competition. In section 4, decreasing returns to scale and capital
adjustment costs are introduced as extensions of the basic model. In both
cases, the Bertrand character of the model disappears and an interior equilib-
rium with unemployment becomes possible. It is shown, however, thai wage
competition still leads lo a decline of the equilibrium wage rate, compared to
a closed economy.
2. Wages and Employment in a Closed and Open Economy
Assume that the world is divided symmetrically into N countries, each coun-
try .endowed with K units of capital and L units of labor.
6 Capital is per-
fectly mobile internationally, whereas labor is immobile. A representative
price-taking firm employs capital K' and iabor iJ to produce in each coun-
try i (i=l...N) a tradablc composite consumption good. A linear homogenous
production function with a positive and declining marginal product of both
gate production function with a declining marginal productivity of labor and no capital. As
the following analysis will show, the basic model of the capital market equilibrium
employed here docs nol lead to a labor demand function with such a property.
' The capacity constraint extension of the Bertrand model of price competition goes back
to Edge-worth (1925). See also Bcckman (1965) and Levithan, Shubik (1972) for examples
of a game theoretical treatment of this model.
6 Assuming a fixed capital endowment, the model abstracts from an intertemporal savings
decision. This simplification, however, is not essential for the main results of this paper as
•he following analysis will show.-3-
factors describes technology. All countries have the same production func-
tion.
Because of the fixed wage rate, the firm may be rationed in its labor input by
the labor endowment of the representative country.
; The firm takes the en-
dowment constraint into account as a restraint of its maximization problem.
The paper only considers wages leading to a strictly positive employment
level in all countries. In addition, it is assumed that the marginal product of
capital gets sufficiently high as the capital input approaches zero and there-
fore also the capital input in all countries is strictly positive. The following
first order conditions then describe the factor market equilibrium (w'
denotes the wage rale in country i, r the world interest rate, the price of the
consumption good is set to one, i=l...N, X' 2 0, and L' <, L ):
= 0, [1]
i,liyW ->! =0, ' [2]
[4]
For N=l, equations [1J - [4] describe the factor market equilibrium in a
closed country. In such a closed country, there is full employment as long as
the wage rate docs not exceed the level w s FjlK^L). For wages below
w
c, the term X is strictly positive. It measures the shadow price of the full
employment constraint or the rent per unit of labor that the representative
7 For more than one firm and an excess labor demand, the allocation of labor across the
single firms has to be modeled explicitly. A parallel rationing rule, where all firms get the
same share of total labor endowment, corresponds to the case of a representative firm
considered here.-4-
firms earns. Wage increases reduce this rent but have no effects on employ-
ment. As the wage rate reaches the limit w
c, the rent takes a value of zero
and further wage increases reduce employment. The following equation




In an open country wages not exceeding w
c also secure full employment. In
addition, because of international capital mobility, there is full employment as
long a the wage rate in the representative country is lower than the wage rate
in any other country (see appendix a). This property of the labor demand
function follows from the assumption of the same constant returns to scale
technology in all countries. As equation [1] shows, the capital market equi-
librium leads to an equal marginal product of capital and an equal capital
intensity in all countries. Because of constant returns to scale, the marginal
product of labor is then also equalized internationally. With different wage
rates, an interior solution with unemployment in all countries is therefore not
possible. Instead, in the low wage countries, labor is fully employed. The
country with the highest wage rate only gets a residual employment level that
results from the fact that employment in the low wage countries is limited to
L.
Suppose, country 1 is the country with the internationally highest wage rale
and that w > w
c. A marginal increase of the wage rate in country 1 then
decreases employment according to the following equation (see appendix b):
22
As w approaches w
c, the employment level in country 1 approaches full
employment. Thus for w~ <,w
c and w = w
c, the impact of a marginal
wage increase is given by the following expression:-5-
According to equation [7], the number of countries influences the employ-
ment effects of a marginal wage increase. The larger the number of countries,
the more pronounced arc these employment effects.
For equal wage rates in all countries the firm is indifferent about the level of
production in the single locations as long as the average employment level
equals the comparable employment level in a closed economy. For simplicity,
it is assumed that in this case the employment !evc! is the same in all coun-
tries.
3. The Equilibrium Wage Rate
Given the impact of the wages on employment, the properties of the wage
competition equilibrium can be derived in this section.
In every country, a national trade union completely controls labor supply and
sets the wage rate for the whole country. With this assumption the model
abstracts from intra-national competition between sectoral or regional trade
unions as well as from competition between unionized and non covered
labor. This assumption also assigns the whole power in determining the wage
rate to the trade unions whereas employer organizations are assumed to have
no influence at all in the wage negotiations.
8 The paper thus models the role
of trade unions in determining the wage rate in a quite simplistic way and
probably overstates the true monopoly power of trade unions. This represen-
tation is chosen nevertheless, as it characterizes the essence of the monopoly
union view most clearly.
8 Allowing for a positive influence of the employer organizations in a "right-lo-manage"
model of wage negotiations would not affect the main results derived in the following
analysis.-6-
All national trade unions decide about their respective wage demand simul-
taneously. Given the expected wages in other countries, each union maxi-
mizes a dillerentiable objective function G' = G[w' ,L'), which is strictly
increasing in both arguments. It is assumed that lor all given foreign wage
demands, a union prefers at least one possible wage-employment com-
bination with a strictly positive employment to any wage rale that leads to
zero employment. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium with zero employ-
ment in one country can be excluded, directly. The following lemma and its
proof show that with perfect capital mobility all trade unions set the wage
rate at the level w
c in equilibrium.
9
Lemma: Suppose N > 1. An equilibrium in pure strategies can exist only
for w' = w
c, i=l...N.
Proof: First, for any country i, a wage rate below w
c can not be an optimal
strategy: The wage rate w
c leads to full employment, irrespectively of the
wage rale in other countries. Since the objective function of the unions is
strictly increasing in the wage rale, the wage w
c dominates all lower wages.
Second, there exists no symmetric equilibrium (iv,...,vv) with w > w
c and
thereforeL
1 <L, i=l...N. Setting VV' = VV-E, E > 0, a'union h would
expect a payoff of G\w- t,LJ. The union's objective function is continuous,
so that lim G\w-t,L) = G[W,L)>G\W,L
1). Thus there exists a strategy
w
l = w- e, e > 0, leading to a higher payoff for trade union h than the
strategy w' = w. Third, no asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategics
[w ,w ,...,w ) exists. In an asymmetric equilibrium, there are two unions k
and /, with w < w and L - L . Since the set of wages satisfying w < w
9 As an equilibrium this paper considers only the concept of a Nash-equilibrium in pure
strategies. Lorz (1997) also investigates the properties of mixed strategy equilibria in the
wage competition game.-7-
is an open set, for every w there exists a strategy w + e, £ > 0, also
leading to Z, = L and a higher payoff for union k. B
The model of wage competition with international capital mobility thus
exhibits a Bertrand paradox similar lo the model of price competition in a
product market: Even for a small number of competitors, a pure strategy
equilibrium can exist only at the "competitive" full employment wage level
w
c. However, because of the full employment constraint of the countries,
the existence of such an equilibrium is not ensured: With the employment
level in the low wage countries limited to their total labor endowment, there
may remain a strictly positive residual employment level in the high wage
country. At w' = w
c, i=l...N, a trade union may thus find it profitable to
increase the desired wage rate and to content itself with the resulting residual
employment level
The lollowing proposition specifies the condition for the existence of the
pure strategy equilibrium at w = w
c, i-l...N. To prove this proposition, the
payoi'f function of any trade union / is assumed to be strictly concave in w'




Proposition: Define the following function:
0(N,K,I) = Ci(w
c,l) + G2lw
c,L) !L _x. [P.I]
\ ' '• > H /
 z\ IF22(KJ.)
The model of wage competition with international capilal mobility has an
equilibrium in pure strategies at w' = w
c, i=l...N, if 0(-)s0. For 6(-)>0,
no equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
1(
1 This assumption is satisfied for a strictly quasi-concave objeclive funclion of the trade
union and a non-increasing marginal impact of Ihe wage rale on the employment level.-8-
Proof: The wage rate w
c dominates all wages below w
c, so that only
w - w
c + c, e > 0 may lead to a higher payoff for the representative trade
union than w = w
c. Equation [7] denotes the employment effect of a mar-




c + e))- G(W
C,l)




For 0(-) > 0, the expected payoff of the representative union increases with a
marginally rising wage rate. The condition '0(-)s 0 thus is necessary for the
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium w' = w
c, i=J...N. Because the
payoff function of the representative union is assumed to be strictly concave
in w for w > w~ and w > w
c, the condition OsO is also sufficient for
the existence of such an equilibrium. B
Although the number of countries N docs not influence the wage level in
equilibrium, it may have an impact on the outcome of wage competition:
With a rising number of countries, the function o(-) declines. An equilibrium
in pure strategics exists for a broader range of parameter values as the num-
ber of countries increases. For N sufficiently high, an equilibrium in pure
strategies exists for all K and L . The outcome of oligopolistic wage com-
petition thus converges via its existence condition to the competitive out-
come, where a union lakes the wage level'as given.
4. Extensions
The Berlrand paradox and the possible nonexistence of an equilibrium in
pure strategies may appear as quite extreme results of wage competition with
international capital mobility. The question therefore arises, whether these
results prove to be robust against realistic modifications and extensions of
the model or whether these extensions lead to less strict outcomes of inter-
national wage competition. This section introduces decreasing returns to
scale and capital adjustment costs as such extensions of the basic model. In-9-
both cases the Bertrand paradox disappears and a symmetric equilibrium with
unemployment in all countries becomes possible.
Decreasing returns to scale with respect to the variable factors capital and
labor may result from negative production externalities or from immobile
factors fixed in supply in the separate countries." To incorporate decreasing
returns to scale into the model, the production function F(K,L) is still
assumed to be homogenous, but of degree less than one. The marginal
product of capital and labor then depends not only on the capital intensity but
also on the scale of production. An interior solution for the equations [1] -
[4] describing the factor market equilibrium may then exist for differing wage
rates in the separate countries.
To illustrate this, suppose all unions impose the same wage rate above the
full employment level. The union in country 1 now increases its demanded
wage level marginally. With constant returns to scale, this implies a jump to
full employment in all low wage countries 2...N, whereas country 1 only gets
the residual employment. With decreasing returns to scale, however, a mar-
ginal wage increase or decrease causes only marginal employment effects.
These employment effects are given by the following equations (see appendix
c):'
u- • "• ' •
" The factors land - including environmental resources - or labor of a different skill level
than unionized labor are examples for such immobile, fixed factors. Production,factors
supplied by the public sector may also lead to decreasing returns to scale - as long as they
can not be employed without any negative congestion effects with respect to the scale of
production.
n With constant returns lo scale the term in the denominator of equations [9] and [10]








With these employment effects wage compclition loses its Bertrand character
and an interior, symmetric equilibrium with unemployment in all countries
may exist. The first order condition of this equilibrium is given by the follow-
ing equation - with country 1 as representative country and w = F2\K,L
F22 -faf
[11]
The payoff function of the representative union is assumed to be strictly con-
cave in w , so that the second order condition for an interior equilibrium is
satisfied. In addition, a symmetric increase of the wage rale in all countries is
assumed to have a negative impact on the marginal payoff of the representa-
tive union. The equilibrium wage rate then declines continuously as the num-
ber of countries rises: For a given wage rale, the left hand side of equation
[11] declines with a rising number of countries. The equilibrium wage rate
then has to adjust accordingly to ensure that equation [11] is satisfied.
Because the marginal payoff is assumed to decline with a symmetrically
increasing wage rale in all countries, this wage adjustment has to be negative.
It should be noted, however, that wilh decreasing returns to scale even for a
large number of countries wage competition docs not necessarily lead to full
employment. The marginal employment effect of a wage increase convergeslo a finite value as N approaches infinity, so that an interior solution satisfy-
ing equation [11] still remains possible.
1
3 ••...•
With adjustment costs as the second extension of the basic model , the
assumption of perfect international capital mobility is dropped. Instead, Ihe
adjustment of the invested capital stock causes strictly convex costs for the
representative firm. To incorporate adjustment costs in the static framework
of the model, it is assumed that initially the invested worldwide capital stock
is distributed equally across all countries. Adjustment costs are then repre-
sented by the twice differentiate function \\)(K' -K\, with ijj(0) = 0,
vp '(()) = 0, ip "(•) > 0 . The following equation [12] replaces equation [1] of
the factor market equilibrium in this case:
[12]
An increasing wage rate in the representative country then causes the follow-
ing adjustment of employment (see appendix c):
"' [13];
As a marginally increasing or decreasing wage rate causes only marginal
employment effects, an interior solution for the equilibrium wage rate
becomes possible in this case. The first order condition then satisfies equa-
tion [11] with equation [13] as the respective marginal wage effect on
employment. As with decreasing returns to scale, an increasing number of
1
3 Anderson, Devereux (1988).have invesligaied union wage setting with a variable capital
stock in a partial equilibrium model. They assume a fixed interest rate and decreasing
returns to scale. Their model can be interpreted as a representation of wage competition in
a small open economy. For a large number of countries, the marginal employment effect of
equation [9] and the equilibrium .wage rale satisfying equation [11] converge to the re-
spective results in Anderson, Devereux (1988).x-12-
countries increases the wage effect on employment and therefore leads to an
increasing wage level in the interior, symmetric equilibrium.
1
4 However, even
lor a large number of countries an interior equilibrium with prevailing unem-




This paper has introduced a stylized model of wage competition between
national trade unions. In this model, international capital mobility increases
the employment effects of unilateral wage variations. This forces the unions
to lower their wage demands - at least as long as wages exceed the full em-
ployment level in a closed economy. Whether wage competition is as intense
as in the Bertrand model or whether some unemployment still may remain in
an open economy equilibrium depends crucially on the conditions under
which wage competition is taking place. However, in all considered variants
of the model, national trade unions lose at least a part of their monopoly
power and employment in all countries increases with the introduction of
capital mobility. Capital mobility thus causes an international institutional
competition between trade unions that is able to compensate insufficient
intra-national competition on the labor market.
1
4 Again, the objective function of the representative union is assumed to be strictly con-
cave and a symmetric increase of the wage rate in all countries is assumed to have a nega-
tive impact on the marginal payoff of the representative union.
1
5 Van der Ploeg (1987) has also investigated trade union behavior in a dynamic frame-
work wilh a variable capital stock and strictly convex adjustment costs. As in Anderson,
Devereux (1987), the interest rate is assumed to be exogenous. A marginal increase of the
wage rate leads to marginally declining steady-state employment level in his model. This
result is comparable to the effect described by equation [13] for the number of countries
approaching infinity.V 13 -
4m Institute fur Weltwirtscbaft
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Appendix
(a) Full Employment in an Open Country
Assume that there exists a country h, with h * 1 andw
 l > w . Equation [1]
implies that the marginal product of capital equates in both countries h and
I.
1
0 Then also the marginal product of labor then cquali/xs in both countries,







As w' > w , X has to be larger than X and therefore also larger than zero.
Equation [3] then can only be satisfied for L = L .
For w ' & w there is also full employment as long as w does not exceed
w . To show this, suppose instead that I, <L and therefore X =0. With
w •< w
c, the following equation has to be satisfied:
F2(K,I) / [A.2]
Since L is assumed to be smaller than L, K also has to be smaller than
K. Equation [4] then implies that at least for one country k, k * 1, the
capital stock K has to exceed K . Equation [1], however, requires an equal
capital intensity in all countries. For K > K this would not be possible, as
L can not exceed L .
(b) The Employment Effects of a Marginal Wage Increase
For w > w~ and
market equilibrium:
For w > w~ and w > w
c, the following equations determine the factor
[A.3]
' Equilibria with either a capital or labor input of zero are ruled out by assumption.- 15-
[A.4]
[A.5J









Using Cramer's rule, the marginal impact of a wage increase on labor demand




Because of the constant returns to scale and internationally equalized capital
intensities, the relationship FXI{K
1 j}\]} = Fn\K~\l)L holds, so that
equation [6] can be derived from [A.7].
(c) Wages and Employment in the Extended Model
Point of departure is a factor market equilibrium with symmetric wage rates
and unemployment. Because of the symmetry assumption, the capital input
and the employment level is the same in all countries. Total differentiation of
equations [2) - [5] with X =K~ =0 and setting dw~ =0 gives the
marginal impact of a wage increase in country 1 on the factor inputs under










 X + l^di:
 l = 0 [A. 10]
dK
] +[N-l]iK~
 l =0 [A. 11]
Inserting the equations [A.10] and [A. 11] in equation [A.8] and then
inserting [A.8] in |A.9] gives equation [9] of the text. Equation (10] then
follows from [A. 10], [A. 11 ] and [9].
With adjustment costs, equation [12] replaces equation [1] in the capital
market equilibrium. Total differentiation of [12] gives the following term:
[Fn - A-QJ//C
1 + L<nd]} = [7-
-u
Inserting [A.10] and [A.11J in [A.12] and then inserting [A.12] in [A.9]
gives equation [13] of the text.